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5. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS ON UNDECLARED EMPLOYMENT
András Semjén & István János Tóth
Introduction
In our analysis we examine the possible effects of economic crisis on both the 
degree and the different forms of undeclared employment. The difficulty of 
the work lies in the fact that there have been no empirical surveys or data that 
could enable us to directly examine the changes that have taken place in un-
declared or informal employment in the labour market by regional or sectorial 
segments, or different types of labour force, since 2008. No empirical research 
referring to this subject has so far been started in Hungary either financed from 
government subsidy or from private funds. Consequently if we wish to investi-
gate the effects of the crisis on the incidence of undeclared work and the socio-
economic factors behind it, we are forced to rely on the data provided by two 
of our own empirical surveys made in the period immediately preceding the 
outbreak of the crisis (in autumn 2007 and spring 2008, see Appendix at the 
end of this chapter), and the findings of the analytic papers based on these data 
(Fazekas et al., 2010, Semjén et al., 2009a, 2009b, Czibik-Medgyesi, 2008, and 
Tóth, 2008). On the basis of the relationships explored in these works, we can 
then formulate hypotheses and draw speculative conclusions regarding the ef-
fects of the crisis. We hope that by way of the review and secondary analysis of 
pre-crisis data surveys, we have been able to arrive at seemingly trivial hypoth-
eses referring to the possible effects of the crisis on the market of undeclared 
employment that, in the future, will be confirmed by empirical studies as well.
In reality, the forms of employment not fully bearing welfare charges (taxes 
and contributions), and thus classified as belonging to the grey economy, are 
of tremendous variety, and the widely used technical terms normally used to 
describe them, like eg. undeclared employment, black labour etc., are not en-
tirely suitable to describe this highly complex reality. In the narrow sense we 
mean by undeclared work any, otherwise legal, income-earning activity that 
has not been reported to the authorities as legal employment, and thus evades 
the payment of income tax and social insurance contribution.
A special case “under the same heading” is when the employer reports the em-
ployee as someone earning a wage below the actual remuneration paid to him, 
and the difference is then paid directly to the employee as “cash in hand” (an 
“off the books” payment, known in Hungary as “payment into the pocket”). 
In such cases, employer and employee split between themselves the taxes and 
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social insurance contributions saved. The risk of getting caught at the labour 
check-up is obviously lower than in the case of classic, totally undeclared work.
Another tax- and contribution-saving form of employment that further re-
duces the risk of being caught is the so-called masked employment, when the 
employer enters into a pretended subcontractor’s agreement with the employee 
and pays him on invoice. It may also happen that the employee at the same time 
is also registered as earning a lower income at the employer’s firm, but this is not 
a necessary condition. As in such cases a part or the whole of the income earn-
ing activity is not registered as employment, in the broader sense we may also 
regard this as some form of undeclared employment. At the same time we can 
consider the use of this term to be a little misleading as the employee in such 
cases is usually reported as having some sort of income in his own enterprise 
or at the employer’s firm. For this reason in our paper, for the sake of greater 
terminological precision, we usually call this situation masked employment. In 
some places, however, such as for example. in titles, subtitles or the introduc-
tion, for brevity’s sake, we use undeclared employment or undeclared work in 
the broader sense as well.
Firstly we are going to deal with the pre-crisis size and social components of 
undeclared employment, then we discuss the possible changes that may have 
occurred on the market of undeclared work as a consequence of the crisis.
The effects of the crisis on employment, hidden employment and 
unemployment
The aggregate employment and unemployment data make it obvious that the 
economic crisis has induced deep changes on the Hungarian labour market. 
(Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Changes in employment and unemployment, 2007–2010
Period
No. of employed  
(1000 people)
No. of unemployed  
(1000 people)
Rate of unemployment  
(%)
2007 August-October 3940.2 310.8 7.3
2008 August-October 3916.2 327.9 7.7
2009 August-October 3788.9 439.5 10.4
2010 May-June 3789.4 467.2 11.0
Source: KSH, http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/fog/fog21007.pdf
Reported employment fell by 150 thousand people between 2007 and 2010, 
while the number of unemployed grew even more than this, by 160 thousand 
people, and the unemployment rate rose from 7.3% to 11.0%. (For further de-
tails regarding the changes in employment and unemployment see the intro-
ductory chapter in this volume by Bálint–Cseres-Gergely–Scharle.)
However, there are also other, much more extreme changes underneath these 
rather gloomy aggregate data in certain regions and sectors, and it is exactly 
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these changes that lend this crisis its special character. Our former research 
suggests that the incidence and the different types of undeclared employment 
show significant territorial and sectorial differences: it is reasonable to think 
that these regional and sectorial effects are further strengthened by the crisis. 
Lőcsei (2009) was the first to call attention to the peculiarities of the territorial 
effects; her analysis published as part 4 of the “In Focus” chapter of the cur-
rent volume provides us with further valuable insight regarding the effects of 
the crisis. Hajnalka Lőcsei has shown that the first period of the crisis mainly 
struck companies producing for export and concerned the labour market of the 
centre and the developed areas, mostly by reducing employment and increas-
ing the number of job-seekers. Later, however, the crisis spread over to the less 
developed regions, further worsening the labour market situation, which in 
the pre-crisis times was not so rosy anyway. Another important observation of 
Lőcsei is that while the former, more developed areas recover relatively quickly, 
in regions lagging behind only government intervention in the labour market 
(communal works) can somewhat moderate the effects of the crisis, while the 
deterioration in the competitive sector because of the crisis seems there to be 
rather more enduring.
These territorial links can efficiently contribute to the analysis of employ-
ment shunning taxes and insurance contributions, as the two basic forms of 
the latter – paying cash in hand and paying the employee as if he were a sub-
contractor, i.e. paying a part of his wage for an invoice issued by the employee’s 
own enterprise – are popular with different social layers and with different 
sectorial and territorial proportions.
Another important consequence of the crisis on the labour market is freez-
ing or reducing the wages for officially declared work. The former was rather 
characteristic of the competitive sphere, while the latter was typical mainly 
of the public sector. In 2009 consumers’ prices rose by 4.2 %; monthly net 
earnings in the competitive sector grew by slightly more than this, 4.4% over 
the year, while wages in the public sector decreased by 4.5% over the same 
period.64
Besides layoffs and wage cuts, the third fundamental effect of the crisis from 
the point of view of our subject was the dramatic decline of business confidence, 
unprecedented since the slow-down following the transition (Figure 5.1). Its 
importance is also due to the fact that it radically influences both the compa-
nies’ short-term reactions, and their longer-term recruitment plans. In the short 
run companies react to the loss of their markets and the substantial fallback 
of orders by cutting down on production costs: besides inevitable staff reduc-
tions, further means of cost containment in such situations are offering only 
tiny wage increases, freezing, or even reducing wages. An interesting corporate 
cost-cutting technique from the aspect of our narrower subject can be shifting 
the internal proportion of tax compliance and tax evasion toward the latter.
64 Source of data: KSH, Stadat-
system, http://portal,ksh.hu/
portal/page?_pageid=-
37.592 051&_dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL
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Figure 5.1: Business confidence among Hungarian enterprises 1998–2010 (%)
Source: The GVI business climate index 1998–2010. GVI, http://www.gvi.hu/index.php/
hu/forecast/show.html?id=13
The degree and forms of undeclared employment before  
the crisis
As the studies in Semjén-Tóth (ed.) (2009) showed from several aspects, a wide 
variety of declared and undeclared types of employment (from entirely legal 
employment to completely hidden forms involving tax evasion) are present in 
the economy simultaneously. Based on a study examining different forms and 
scenarios of tax evasion with agent-based models (Szabó et al., 2009), 23 types 
of payment packages can be distinguished (Table 5.2).
From this wide variety of forms, we will give a closer look at only two basic 
types of evading or avoiding taxes and contributions, paying cash in hand 
and “invoice-based payments” or “masking employment as subcontracting” 
(Figure 5.2). When the employees receive their pay from the employer di-
rectly as unreported cash payments in hand, both the employment and the 
payment remain totally invisible for the authorities. In the other case ex-
amined here the employees receive at least some part of their compensation 
not in the form of wages but as a subcontractor, “in return for an invoice”. 
In the short term this is a practice favourable both for the employer and the 
employee: for the employer the non-payment of taxes and contributions re-
duces the labour costs, and, provided that the two parties split the unpaid 
public dues, it may enhance the chance of employment and increase dispos-
able income for the employee.
When examining the incidence of working in the hidden economy among 
adults in the18–60 age-group one can find that the rate of those receiving cash 
in hand was about 15%, while those receiving at least part of their pay on an 
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invoice (pretended subcontractors) were around 13–14% in the years preced-
ing the crisis.
Table 5.2: The 23 different types of payment combinations
No.
Paying  
reported 
wages
Fringe 
benefits
Paying on an in-
voice (pretended 
subcontracting)
Paying cash  
in hand Paying in kind Type
1 • Legal
2 • • Legal
3 • • Mixed
4 • • Mixed
5 • • Mixed
6 • • • Mixed
7 • • • Mixed
8 • • • Mixed
9 • • • Mixed
10 • • • Mixed
11 • • • Mixed
12 • • • • Mixed
13 • • • • Mixed
14 • • • • Mixed
15 • • • • Mixed
16 • • • • • Mixed
17 • Hidden
18 • • Hidden
19 • • Hidden
20 • • • Hidden
21 • Hidden
22 • • Hidden
23 • Hidden
Note: The dots in the cells of the table indicate the incidence of the given form of pay-
ment.
Source: Szabó et al., 2009.
Among those paid cash in hand there were some who received only a smaller 
part of their pay in this way, while there were others, who received the greater 
part of the pay as black (unreported and untaxed) payment. 5% of all respond-
ents received less than half of their pay as unreported cash payment the last time 
they used this method, while 7% of the respondents received more than half of 
their remuneration in this way when they last did any undeclared work as moon-
lighters. Those who did any work as pretended subcontractors, the last time 
typically received the larger part of their pay on invoice (16% of the age-group 
mentioned), while 2% received only a smaller part of their pay in this form.
The spring 2008 survey showed that over the two years preceding the survey 
26% of the 18–60 age-group of the Hungarian population had at some point 
been paid either cash in hand, or on an invoice as pretended subcontractors. 
Projecting this ratio to the 15–64 population (4.2 million people), the number 
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of those in Hungary who had received any sort of undeclared labour income 
(more precisely, any labour income that was either totally unreported or reg-
istered not as labour income and thus completely or partly failed paying taxes 
and contributions) can be estimated at over 1 million people.
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Figure 5.2: Incidence of labour related payments on invoice and as cash in 
hand payments among employees, casual workers and people of active 
working age in Hungary, 2007–2008 (%)
Source: Tóth (2008).
Considering the distortion of opinions obviously occurring during a data sur-
vey, i.e. that some respondents may have withheld the truth about their par-
ticipation in hidden employment, this number is likely to be bigger and the 
number of those really concerned may significantly exceed 1 million people.
It can also be substantiated that the respondents with a first-hand experience 
either of undeclared employment or of employment masked as “pretended sub-
contracting” typically only used just one of these two methods to shun taxes 
and contributions, and only 2% of them used both types of tax- and contribu-
tion-saving solutions during the time surveyed.
We also asked the other members of the respondents’ households whether 
they had any labour income during the time of the survey, and if so, in what 
form they were paid: did they receive fully taxable reported income, unreported 
cash in hand, entrepreneurial income from “pretended subcontracting”, pay-
ment for temporary work registered in the casual work booklet, liable to reduced 
tax and contribution rates only. This also made it possible to examine whether 
the spouses of the respondents were also concerned by the hidden economy.
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Examining the households of all respondents between 18–60, irrespective 
of their labour market status, in 7% of the households neither spouse had any 
kind of labour income (Figure 5.3). There was only one labour income recipi-
ent per household in 26% of the households, and these recipients received their 
pay as taxed income. In 6% of the households there was also only one labour 
income recipient, but they typically received the greater part of their pay as 
cash in hand or on invoice. In almost half of the households there was more 
than one labour income recipient, and all of them received their pay as taxed 
income. In 12% of the households there were more than one labour income 
recipient and at least one of those received the greater part of their pay on in-
voice or as cash in hand. However, in the sample one can find only a tiny part 
(1%) of households in which there are more than one labour income recipient, 
and where there are also at least two household members paid cash in hand or 
receiving income from pretended subcontracting.
Figure 5.3: Undeclared work in the household, 2008 (%)
Source: Tóth (2008).
So the accumulation of undeclared employment (or employment masked as 
subcontracting) within a household is not typical. The households of employ-
ees and casual workers show a similar pattern to that of the households in the 
active working age, the only difference being that in the first group the rate of 
households with no employment income is obviously lower.
Below we examine how the probability of undeclared employment (or pre-
tended subcontracting) varies in the different socio-economic groups of the 
Hungarian population. We analyse the incidence of undeclared employment 
first by demographic variables, then by labour market characteristics, eventu-
ally by the financial position of the households.
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An important statement made by empirical studies is that in Hungary unde-
clared work is much more wide-spread among men than among women. (Elek 
et al., 2009). The surveys analysed here confirm the above statement: the oc-
currence of cash in hand payments shows a higher frequency among men, eg. 
in the 2008 survey 19% of them received cash in hand, while for women the 
same proportion was only 11%. The occurrence of payment on invoice is also 
slightly higher among men.
We can also find substantial differences in undeclared employment accord-
ing to age (Figure 5.4). Young employees are more affected, the cash in hand 
method of remuneration occurs more often among these than the average. 
Among employees and casual workers, 17% of those under 30 have received 
some remuneration as cash in hand, while in the other age-groups this rate is 
around 10%. The rate of those receiving their pay on invoice as pretended sub-
contractors does not show significant age differences, however, if both main 
forms of undeclared employment are considered, it is obvious that the young 
are more affected, as unreported labour income (paid cash in hand or on in-
voice) shows a higher than average incidence among them.
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Figure 5.4: Undeclared work by age groups (%)
Source: Tóth (2008).
The two types of tax-saving employment (undeclared work or employment 
masked as subcontracting) show different patterns in relation to educational 
attainment. The frequency of receiving cash in hand payments decreases as 
school qualification increases. Among those employed regularly or working as 
casual workers 22% of those with only a primary school qualification received 
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cash in hand, compared to only 6% among those with a college or university 
degree. However, in the case of paying on invoice for pretended subcontract-
ing, the situation proved to be the reverse: those with a degree show a higher 
incidence of receiving their pay in this form than those with lower qualifica-
tions. All in all, among employees the incidence of employment not bearing, 
or not fully bearing, taxes and contributions increases with the decrease of 
school qualification: Among those who attended a maximum of eight forms 
of primary school, 36% received cash in hand or payment on invoice, whereas 
among university graduates only 27% received such payments as remuneration.
These data (Figure 5.5) do not, however, reveal how wages paid for unde-
clared work would change the income differences between university gradu-
ates and those with lower qualifications, estimated from earnings stemming 
from declared employment. Recent research (Köllő, 2010b) have pointed out 
that while university graduates conceal 23–41% of their income, households 
where the head of the family has a lower school qualification hide only 8–13% 
of their income. This suggests that hiding income is more common among 
university graduates than among those with lower qualifications, so the actu-
al income difference between the two categories can be greater than reflected 
by official statistics.
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Figure 5.5: Undeclared work according to level of educational attainment (%)
Source: Tóth (2008).
Undeclared employment is slightly more frequent than the average in Budapest 
and in the villages. Among employees and casual workers, 28% of those living 
in Budapest and 32% of those living in villages were paid on invoice or cash in 
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hand. We also found similar rates when examining the incidence of black and 
grey labour in the whole of the adult population.
Looking at the regional characteristics of hidden and masked employment 
(i.e. undeclared employment and employment masked as subcontracting), we 
can also find significant differences. In the counties of Eastern Hungary this 
type of work is much more common, while in Western Hungary it is less fre-
quent than the average. Among employees and casual workers, in Eastern Hun-
gary 40% of the surveyed population received cash in hand payments or was 
paid on invoice, while in Western Hungary this rate was only 16%. In central 
Hungary one can find average rates.
If we look at undeclared employment according to labour market status, it 
is clear that within the 18–60 year-old population undeclared employment is 
most common amongst those who are economically active but without regu-
lar employment (i.e. casual workers and the unemployed). 42% of the above 
group received cash in hand and 21% of them did work for payment on invoice 
in the two years preceding the survey, and in total 55% of them did some work 
shunning the payment of taxes and contributions. Among those having regu-
lar work, the rate of those paid cash in hand is roughly average, while the rate 
of those paid on invoice is somewhat higher (17%) than what is typical of the 
whole sample (14%) (Figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6: The share of those receiving labour compensation as cash in hand 
or on invoice according to labour market status in the 18–60 age group (%)
Source: Semjén et al. (2009b).
We also examined among regular and casual workers, how the type of their 
occupation and the industry they worked in influenced the incidence of un-
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declared work and employment masked as subcontracting. As to occupation-
al categories, blue-collar workers, white-collar workers and managers were 
distinguished. Among white-collar workers the rate of those having received 
cash in hand payments was only 2%, which is considerably lower than the 8% 
observed among blue-collar workers. On the other hand, the rate of those re-
ceiving pay as pretended subcontractors was higher among white-collar work-
ers: in total 22% of them received pay on invoice, while this rate was only 18% 
among blue-collar workers.
At the same time it came as a surprise that among managers the share of those 
receiving cash payments in hand was rather high (15%). However, due to the 
low number of observed cases in this category, this result does not allow us to 
form a robust conclusion.
Due to the low number of cases we had to reduce the number of sectors by 
merging some of them in order to be able to analyse the sectorial patterns of 
undeclared work. Apart from industry and agriculture, services were grouped 
in four categories. We drew together traffic, communications, telecommuni-
cations, and trade and created from them one complex category; financial ser-
vices and other services were treated as separate categories, while the fourth 
category (communal services) was made up of public administration, educa-
tion, culture and health care. The rate of those receiving payments as cash in 
hand was lower in financial services and especially in communal services, than 
in the other sectors (5% and 2% respectively). At the same time the rate of those 
paid as pretended subcontractors was the highest in communal services. In 
communal services 25% of workers received pay on invoice, compared with 
an overall average of 19% (Figure 5.7).
The research based on our previous survey results has also shown how the 
level of compensation received in the main job influenced the incidence of un-
declared work among employees and casual workers, and to what extent the 
former determined whether the respondent had any second job or enterprise.
With those having a main job pay of less than 70,000 forints, the rate of 
those paid cash in hand was somewhat higher than the average. Those with low 
earnings showed a higher than average rate (13 %) of being paid black money. 
With those having a higher main job pay, however, payment on invoice had a 
higher frequency (23%). For those with no extra earnings beside their man job 
pay the incidence of cash payments in hand or pretended subcontracting did 
not differ from the values typical of the whole of the sample. The number of 
those mentioning any income from second or part-time jobs is rather low, but 
among those having a second source of labour income the incidence of cash in 
hand payments is especially high, which makes it likely that in the field of sec-
ond and part-time jobs undeclared work or pretended employment may have 
an important role.
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Figure 5.7: The share of those receiving labour compensation as cash  
in hand or on invoice according to economic sectors among employees  
and casual workers, 2007–2008 (%)
Source: Tóth (2008)
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The 2008 survey made it possible for us to also analyse the incidence of casual 
work among those not working regularly at the time of the survey, i.e. among 
those who are registered as inactive or unemployed. Doing casual work char-
acterized only 11% of those without regular work according to the survey, but 
it typically went together with receiving some part of labour income as cash 
in hand or working on invoice. Low case numbers make it impossible to carry 
out a more detailed analysis, but even this is enough to show that work among 
the officially jobless or inactive is usually related to the black or grey economy.
Unemployment, however, affects working in the hidden economy not only 
as a current state of affairs. Research in labour economics has shown that the 
longer someone has been unemployed, the more difficult it is for them to find 
new employment. On the basis of this, the number of months spent out of a 
job may forecast the individual’s chances for finding a job, his or her labour 
market opportunities. Accordingly, those who have been unemployed for a 
longer time may show a higher rate of undeclared work (or pretended subcon-
tracting), as they find it more difficult to find a job on the official job market.
The findings of our surveys corroborate this hypothesis: amongst those hav-
ing been out of job for more than a year 25% admitted being paid cash in hand, 
which is ten percentage points higher than the average. For those with no pre-
vious unemployment spells, this rate was only 9%. However, the rate of those 
paid on invoice was the highest not among those who have been jobless for the 
longest time, but among those who were in this situation for shorter than half 
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a year. Since in this group the rate of those paid cash in hand is also relatively 
high, it is justified to consider this group to be the most affected by participa-
tion in the hidden economy.
The incidence of undeclared work and pretended employment varies not only 
according to regional, sectorial, qualification and labour market variables, but 
also according to the financial position of the households (Figure 5.8). On the 
one hand it is conspicuous that the incidence of undeclared work and pretend-
ed subcontracting is more typical of the less well-off households with lower in-
comes: while in 31% of the lowest quartile of households, from an income point 
of view, at least one active member of the household does undeclared work, this 
rate for the highest quartile is only 23%. At the same time, income per house-
hold and the incidence of shunning labour related taxes and contributions do 
not show a linear relationship: the lowest participation rate in work partly or 
fully shunning taxes and contributions can be observed not in the highest, but 
in the third quartile (20%). On the other hand, the incidence of the two types 
of undeclared work surveyed also shows a difference according to household 
incomes. While receiving cash in hand payments is rather characteristic of the 
poorer households (it can be observed in 20% of the households belonging to 
the lowest income quartile), the incidence of being paid on invoice does not 
seem to be correlated with household income in the same way.
Figure 5.8: The share of those compensated for work with payments on invoice  
or cash in hand according to the quartiles of per capita family income, 2008 (%)
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Source: Semjén et al. (2009b).
The profile of those involved in undeclared work and pretended subcontracting 
can be summarized on the basis of Semjén et al. (2009b) as follows: the share 
of those paid cash in hand is the highest among those on the peripheries of the 
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labour market. People with lower school qualifications, casual workers, jobless 
people, and those, currently in employment, having formerly spent a longer pe-
riod out of work all show a higher than average likelihood of being paid cash in 
hand. It is more typical of the poorer households that at least one family mem-
ber takes undeclared work. On the other hand, the incidence of payments on 
invoice is undoubtedly higher than average among white collar workers. The 
occurrence of having been paid (also) on invoice during the last two years seems 
to be above average amongst people with a higher education degree, those work-
ing in public administration, health care, education and culture.
Aside from the incidence of work partly or fully avoiding or evading taxes 
and contributions, there is another aspect worth taking into consideration for 
our current subject. This is how employees justify taking job offers for unde-
clared work or pretended subcontracting. The responses highlight the employ-
ees’ motivations concerning undeclared or masked work and can be helpful in 
pointing out the possible effects of the crisis.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Doesn’t knowDid not play a roleDid play a role
Would not have got
the job otherwise
Was better off
like this
Was compelled
to work
Per cent
Figure 5.9: Motives of accepting job offers involving cash in hand payments, 2008 (%)
Source: Semjén et al. (2009b).
It can be seen from the survey results highlighted above that 15% of the re-
spondents had done work for which they had been partly or fully paid cash in 
hand.65 But also the respondents who had not received cash in hand payments 
could have come across such job offers. On the basis of the 2008 survey (Semjén 
et al., 2009b) we can see that 4% of those not receiving any pay as cash in hand 
had received job offers with such a payment arrangement, which they eventu-
ally turned down. The results also show that in total 18% of the respondents 
had come across job offers involving cash in hand payments. Looking at this 
from the other side, 29% of those having been offered work with cash in hand 
65 Besides this, Semjén et al. 
(2009b, pp. 238–239) also give 
a detailed analysis of the reasons 
for accepting or refusing offers 
for pretended subcontracting.
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compensation turned down all these offers, while 56% accepted some of these 
offers (the remaining 14% could not answer the question).
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Figure 5.10: Motives of refusing job offers involving cash in hand payments 2008 (%)
Source: Semjén et al. (2009b).
We have analysed the motivations which lay in the background of accepting 
or refusing such job offers in the case of those who had already received (and at 
least once accepted or refused) such offers. In our survey we asked them about 
the reasons for their decision related to the last such offer they had received. 
Both for refusal and for acceptance, they could choose one or more motivations 
from several options (listed in the form of closed questions).
Those who accepted work offers involving cash in hand compensation men-
tioned most frequently the pressure of need (lacking means of subsistence) as 
the justification for accepting the offer (Figure 5.9): 56% answered that they 
had accepted the offer because they were compelled to work; 39% said they had 
accepted it because they were better off this way, while 34% replied that it also 
played a part in their decision that otherwise they would not have received the job.
Those who turned down job offers involving cash in hand mentioned most 
often the uncertainty of payment as the reason for their decision: this factor 
played a part in the negative decision of 40% of those refusing these offers. 
About one third was the share of those who mentioned low pay and bad work-
ing conditions, while 23% referred to the fact that black labour is illegal, that 
it involves violating the law and may entail punishment (Figure 5.10).
Possible changes occurring as a consequence of the crisis
Linking the main characteristics of undeclared work and pretended subcon-
tracting to the documented effects of the crisis on the legal economy and de-
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clared employment it seems to be safe to conclude that the economic crisis has, 
in all probability, increased the amount and the incidence of undeclared work. 
As we will see, however, the situation is far from being so simple.
Before going into details on these possible effects, let us have an a priori look 
at the changes the crisis could have induced in the first place in the incidence 
and the relative share of declared employment vs. undeclared employment or 
pretended subcontracting in a company or firm. Table 5.3 provides a summary 
of the different types of such changes or reactions. We distinguished 13 differ-
ent types of these in the table. Each of these starts out from the characteristics 
of the pre-crisis employment and the nature of the related payment packages 
chosen by the employer and accepted by the employee (this serves also as the 
basis for the division of the table into three main blocs). The outcome or result 
is the change: a shift or a modification of the type of employment relationship 
occurring as a result of the crisis (2nd column). In the table we have indicated 
separately (3rd column) how the given change appears – if it does at all – in the 
official wage and labour statistics reflecting declared work and reported income.
Table 5.3: Possible effects of the crisis on the choice between declared (reported) 
and undeclared (unreported) forms of payment
Type Changes caused by the crisis Change appearing in labour and wage statistics
Before the crisis: declared employment
1. Wage reduction in declared employment and paying on 
invoice appears
Reduction of gross wage
2. Wage reduction in declared employment and cash in 
hand appears
Reduction of gross wage
3. Wage reduction in declared employment, cash in hand 
and paying on invoice appear
Reduction of gross wage
4. Layoffs, paying on invoice Reduction of employment, impact  
on average gross wages uncertain
5. Layoffs, cash in hand Reduction of employment, impact  
on average gross wages uncertain
6. Layoffs, paying on invoice and cash in hand Reduction of employment, impact  
on average gross wages uncertain
7. Layoffs Reduction of employment, impact  
on average gross wages uncertain
Before the crisis: declared employment with payments avoiding/evading taxes and contributions  
(paying on invoice or paying cash in hand)
8. Wage reductions and a growing share of paying on invoice 
within all payments
Reduction of gross wage
9. Wage reductions and growing share of cash in hand within 
all payments
Reduction of gross wage
10. Wage reduction and growing share of paying on invoice 
and cash in hand within all payments
Reduction of gross wage
Before the crisis: undeclared work or employment masked as subcontracting
11. Decrease or cessation of cash in hand Does not appear
12. Decrease or cessation of pay on invoice Does not appear
13. Decrease or cessation of pay on invoice or cash in hand Does not appear
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All but the last three (types 11–13) of the types listed clearly indicate an in-
crease of the share of undeclared or masked employment, either in such a way 
that the change in the payment package directly increases the share of unde-
clared or masked employment, or indirectly, so that it involves a reduction of 
declared employment, while at the same time it does not change the amount 
of undeclared work or masked employment (e.g. type 7).
We can distinguish three types of corporate decisions related to wages and 
employment, occurring as a result of the crisis, according to how deeply they 
affect the company’s internal regulations and organization.
“Low intensity” adaptation. It does not affect either the size of the work-
force or the internal proportions of the payment packages applied: freezing or 
reduction of wages.
“More intensive” adaptation that affects employment as well as the internal 
proportions of payment packages: switching to part-time employment, and in-
troducing payment packages that make undeclared work and pretended subcon-
tracting possible.
Adaptation having fundamental importance from the aspect of the compa-
ny’s internal organization and internal corporate regulations. Layoff, followed 
by re-employment, this time completely as undeclared work or pretended subcon-
tracting belongs to this third type.
Hungarian companies under the influence of the crisis can take the above 
steps, or a combination of these steps, and thus can have an effect on the inci-
dence and volume of undeclared work within the competitive sector.
If a company only used declared employment before the crisis, i.e. if employ-
ment in the company complied with the rules of paying taxes and contribu-
tions, then under the influence of the crisis, as part of the cost-cutting steps, 
the company may decide to freeze or reduce wages, while in order to cut down 
on payroll taxes, it may begin in certain groups of employees to apply payment 
packages involving cash in hand payments or payments on invoice. These forms 
of adaptation do not involve layoffs, but reduce gross wages that the Statistical 
Office can keep an eye on, thus distorting official wage statistics.
Company reactions can be represented as new types if these reactions include 
the dismissal and, in some form or other, the hidden re-employment of the same 
employee (types 4–6). At these times one can see a reduction of employment in 
the official statistics, while actual employment did not change: the same person 
continues to work in the same place, maybe for the same (net) wage, as earlier, 
only now they do this in the black market. However, the effect of this practice 
on the documented average wages is uncertain as we do not know whether 
these dismissals and hidden re-employments affected mainly employees with 
lower-than-average or with higher-than-average wages.
The weight of undeclared work and pretended subcontracting is increased 
by the 7th type of adaptation as well, although indirectly: if an employee in 
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declared employment is dismissed and then later does not find work either on 
the formal or the informal labour market, while everything else is held con-
stant, the share of undeclared work or employment masked as pretended sub-
contracting within the total will increase in this case as well.
If a company also used the types of payment typical of undeclared work and 
work masked as subcontracting already before the crisis (as in adaptation types 
8–10), it can increase the share of these kinds of tax- and contribution-saving pay-
ments within the labour compensation package under the influence of the crisis 
without ever changing the number of employees in any way. Then in the official 
statistics we can see a decrease or just a slight increase of wages, while, in fact, there 
could have been a wage increase larger than what could be seen in the statistics.
We left those types that do not increase, but decrease the share of undeclared 
work in the economy for the end. It is worth noting that the economic crisis 
does not only affect the market of declared labour. Why should we think that 
it leaves the market of undeclared work untouched? Of course, the crisis does 
not leave these markets unaffected either: the significant reduction of orders 
also reduces the business opportunities of companies that had also relied on 
undeclared work before the crisis, and typically paid the majority of the work-
ers cash in hand or on invoice. For these firms cost-cutting means the decrease 
of sums paid out in an undeclared form, or the dismissal of unreported em-
ployees, i.e. on these markets the economic crisis leads to the reduction of un-
declared work and its relative weight.
Let us just take the construction sector as an example, which, in Hungary, ap-
plies undeclared work and pretended subcontracting much more commonly than 
any other economic sector (Semjén et al., 2009a). By the end of 2009, the produc-
tion volume of the construction sector shrank to 77% of its 2005 level, and the 
declining tendency continued dramatically in the first six months of 2010, which 
saw another 14% reduction of the production volume of the previous year. The 
number of employees appearing in the official statistics also fell between 2007–
2009 from 330,000 to 293,000, i.e. by nearly forty thousand people66 – but we 
know that this decrease could also cover an actual increase of employment. The 
data describing the development of the production volume, however, suggest that 
undeclared employment or employment masked as subcontracting in the con-
struction industry could have reduced at a much more rapid pace in consequence 
of the crisis than the pace of reduction shown in the official employment data. 
This means, had it depended on the construction sector alone, undeclared em-
ployment would have decreased in the Hungarian economy as a result of the crisis.
Presumably, however, a process with the opposite direction was taking place 
in the economy as a whole: we must unfortunately presume that, in consequence 
of the crisis, undeclared employment and pretended subcontracting became 
more wide-spread, and within the total remuneration received for works done, 
the share of cash in hand payments and payments on invoice increased.
66 For data referring to produc-
tion and employment in the 
construction industry see KSH 
Stadat-system, http://por tal. 
ksh.hu/portal/page?_pageid= 
37,592051&dad=portal&_
schema=PORTAL.
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The reasons behind this hypothesis are basically the effects enumerated in 
the first part of our paper. In the centre of these effects we can find unemploy-
ment. Examining it from the employees’ side, we can reach, through multiple 
cause and effect chains, from the fact of unemployment, or from its growing 
risk, to the growing probability and growing rate of accepting undeclared work.
Based on the findings of the population surveys made using questionnaires, 
employment involving cash in hand payments can be considered to be an inter-
mediary position on the labour market between completely legal employment 
and unemployment. Together with the increase of the level of educational at-
tainment the incidence of employment with cash in hand payments decreas-
es, while it is also well-known that the risk of unemployment increases exactly 
with the decrease of educational attainment. The reverse correlation between 
educational attainment and cash in hand payments can be partly explained 
by the fact that payment packages involving cash in hand are often refused be-
cause of “uncertain pay” and “bad working conditions”. Taking these aspects 
into consideration is more typical of people with higher qualifications than of 
those with a lower level of schooling. In this respect we may conclude that the 
higher level of educational attainment simultaneously diverts the employees 
from accepting compensation packages including cash in hand payments and 
helps reduce the risks of unemployment.
Unemployment, however, is also directly connected with the incidence of 
undeclared work and cash in hand payments or paying on invoice. We could 
see earlier that unemployed people and casual workers showed a higher propen-
sity of accepting work offers with cash in hand payments or paying on invoice 
than employees. Thus it is obvious that the growth of unemployment raises the 
probability of accepting remuneration packages that include cash in hand pay-
ments or paying on invoice, and so it increases undeclared employment. In the 
broader sense, the risk of unemployment referred to by the former “experience 
of unemployment” makes the employee inclined to take undeclared work. It 
shows in the same direction if we extend the interpretation of the risk of un-
employment from the employee to the employee’s household. If one member of 
the household has already been out of job, this fact makes (black or on-invoice) 
employment in the form of undeclared work more likely. We can render these 
effects probable not only on the basis of logical considerations, their existence 
is also confirmed by more sophisticated mathematical-statistical analysis (Sem-
jén et al., 2009a, Fazekas et al., 2010).
In harmony with the above, the demand for undeclared work and employ-
ment masked as subcontracting presumably increases in the first stage of the 
crisis in those economic sectors and local labour markets in which and where 
the crisis caused unemployment to grow – so primarily in the centre and in 
the developed regions of the Dunántúl. It seems also likely that later – when 
the orders of companies stopped falling or started to increase in these regions 
(late 2009 or early 2010), unemployment could not grow any higher and em-
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ployment also increased slightly, and together with these the incidence of un-
declared employment or pretended subcontracting also started to decline.
This is not the case, however, with the regions regarded as backward already 
be fore the crisis: here unemployment showed a high level before the crisis as 
well, and the crisis worsened this situation further with effects that could also 
lead to the reduction or the elimination of undeclared employment (this could 
be typical of the regions of North-West Hungary). Amidst the economic cri-
sis, the labour market of these regions is (hardly) kept alive by public sector 
employment, state subsidies and communal works.
Appendix
The surveys
We have used findings from two questionnaire surveys in our analysis. One of 
the surveys referred to the savings behaviour of the population in relation to pen-
sions, and was conducted using questionnaires during personal interviews taken 
between October and 9th November. This survey was prepared for the Economic 
and Enterprise Research Institute of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry. The survey sample of one thousand people consisted of people in their 
active working age, and was representative in terms of their types of settlements, 
regions, gender and age group. The second survey was commissioned in 2008 by 
the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and it explic-
itly aimed at surveying the participation in the hidden economy and opinions 
about this. This research was also carried out on a sample of 1000 people repre-
senting the adult population of the country between 18 and 60.
Surveying undeclared employment was carried out using similar questions 
in both cases. In both surveys the respondents were asked whether they had 
ever received a part or the whole of their pay as cash in hand. They were then 
asked about the share of the payment they had received as cash in hand the last 
time as compared to the total remuneration for the job.
Similarly, the respondents were also asked whether they had ever received 
a part or the whole of their remuneration for their work on invoice, as a fee 
from pretended subcontracting. If the answer was “yes”, they were also asked 
what part of the total payment they had received was paid in this way. In spite 
of the similar formulation of the questions, however, there are also two differ-
ences between the two research projects in surveying employment in the hid-
den economy. On the one hand, in the 2007 survey the questions referred to 
the preceding one year (i.e. 2006), while in the 2008 survey the questions re-
ferred to the two years preceding the survey (i.e. 2006 and 2007). The other 
difference is that in the 2007 survey we asked these questions referring to un-
declared employment only from those who were either under an employment 
contract at the time of the survey, or who worked as casual workers at that time. 
So here we did not receive responses from the self-employed, the unemployed 
and the economically inactive.
